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v. Brinson.9 There the parties, whose celebrated marriage in
Louisiana was null by reason of the man's undissolved marriage
to another, later moved to Mississippi and continued to live to-
gether as man and wife after the man's first wife died. The court,
admitting at least arguendo that under Mississippi law their con-
duct would have constituted the contracting of marriage, never-
theless presumed the continuation of concubinage in the absence
of a formal ceremony of marriage. This decision in Brinson was
criticized by Professor Dainow on the ground that the form of
marriage celebration (exchange of consent) should be considered
subject to the law of the place of celebration (exchange of con-
sent) .10 The writer also considers this position correct and hence
agrees that Dupre was decided correctly on this principal issue.
It may be pointed out nevertheless that it would be wrong to
presume the intent of a couple to be husband and wife simply
because they live together in a jurisdiction recognizing informal
marriage, especially if their life in common began in plain con-
cubinage or after a marriage ceremony known to be invalid. The
intent to be married must be shown to have existed at a time at
which the parties could have contracted marriage informally, for




The Louisiana Constitution provides that, except in a capital
case, prosecution "shall be by indictment or information."1 In
State v. La Caze,2 defendants, jointly charged in a bill of infor-
mation with simple burglary,3 moved to quash the information
on the basis of the fifth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury.. ."), and the fourteenth amendment. The motions
were overruled and the convictions affirmed. State v. Young4
had held the quoted words of the fifth amendment inapplicable
9. 233 La. 417, 96 So.2d 653 (1957).
10. The Work of the Louisiana Stpreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-
Conflict of Laws, 18 LA. L. REv. 60, 62 (1957).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
2. 252 La. 971, 215 So.2d 511 (1968).
3. LA. R.S. 14:62 (1950).
4. 249 La. 609, 188 So.2d 421 (1966).
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to the states, and the force of this decision was not lessened by
Duncan v. Louisiana, which dealt solely with the right to trial
by jury.
In City of Bogalusa v. May,0 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
considered an ordinance containing this language: "No person
shall distribute, or cause to be distributed, within the Corporate
Limits ... any printed, multigraphed, photographed, mimeo-
graphed, typewritten or written pamphlet, circular, card, dodger,
poster or advertisement, by depositing same on the streets ...
or upon the private property of other persons ... without their
permission, if such does not contain the name of the person,
association, organization, committee, partnership, or corporation
responsible for its distribution." Penalties were defined. An
information charging violation of the ordinance was dismissed
on the ground that the ordinance infringed rights of free speech
and press guaranteed by the Constitutions of Louisiana and of
the United States, and the judgment was affirmed. This result
was in accord with Talley v. California,8 which invalidated a
Los Angeles ordinance that "bars all handbills under all circum-
stances anywhere that do not have the names and addresses
printed on them," of which the United States Supreme Court
said: "There can be no doubt that such an identification require-
ment would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information
and thereby freedom of expression."9
Marino v. Waters10 was an action by a high school student,
unable to continue in a parochial high school owing to his mar-
riage, who moved to another school district, enrolled in a public
high school, and sought to enjoin the high school athletic asso-
ciation from enforcing against him its rule that a student who
transfers from one school to another may not represent the lat-
ter in athletic contests. The court emphasized its reluctance to
interfere with the internal affairs of a voluntary association," and
held that there was no denial of due process as the challenged
rule was rational and had been fairly and consistently applied.
Two recent cases raised issues under both federal and state
5. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
6. 252 La. 629, 212 So.2d 408 (1968).
7. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
8. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
9. Id. at 64.
10. 220 So.2d 802 (La. App. lst Cir. 1969).
11. Cf. Heuer v. Crescent City River Port Pilots' Ass'n, 158 So.2d 221
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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constitutions. Michel v. Edmonson12 dealt with R.S. 13:4522,
which permits a defendant to require a plaintiff to post security
for court costs.13
Plaintiff attacked the statute under article I, section 1 of
the Louisiana Constitution; article I, section 2 (the due process
clause); and especially article I, section 6, which provides:
"All courts shall be open and every person for injury done
him in his rights, lands, goods, person or reputation shall
have adequate remedy by due process of law and justice
administered without denial, partiality or unreasonable de-
lay."
The court properly held that the statute does not offend
either the Louisiana Constitution or the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution. Consistently with the equal
protection clause, "classifications of citizens who are similarly
situated may be established by the legislature, so long as such
classifications are based on reasonable grounds . . . ," and the
court found "valid grounds to treat plaintiffs as a class in civil
actions different from defendants under the state statute author-
izing security for costs."'1 4 The Louisiana Constitution requires
no more. As the Louisiana Supreme Court said in Grinage v.
Times-Democrat Publishing Co.: 5 "While a plaintiff is primarily
bound for the costs of a suit he institutes, it is not always true
that he is financially able to respond. A defendant may make
large outlays in vindicating his position, and may successfully
vindicate it, and yet at the end of the suit with a judgment dis-
charging him, may be unable to recoup his expenditures. There-
fore it is that the requirement of a bond for costs has always
been sustained."
In Osborn Funeral Home v. Louisiana State Board of Em-
balmers, 6 plaintiff, which had advertised that it would credit
against burial costs the face value of any valid burial policy,
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the board and
challenged parts of R.S. 37:846 as in violation of the guarantees
of free speech and press in the Constitution of Louisiana 7 and
12. 218 So.2d 103 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
13. LA. R.S. 13:4522 (1950) excludes suits in forma pauperis and those
against the state and its political subdivisions. Nor does it apply to Orleans
Parish.
14. 218 So.2d 103, 105 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
15. 107 La. 121, 123, 31 So. 682, 683 (1902).
16. 216 So.2d 145 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
17. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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the United States, of the due process clause of both constitu-
tions,18 and of the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. R.S. 37:846 gives the board the power to deny a
license to any applicant found to be offering discounts or gratu-
ities to prospective customers, or to revoke or refuse to renew a
license. Funeral directors furnishing services under a contract
with a burial insurance company are excluded from this provi-
sion.
Plaintiff's principal contention was that exemption of such
persons was a denial to plaintiff of equal protection of the laws.
The evidence established that "a large percentage of funeral
homes in the state have direct connections with burial insurance
companies and that the practice of designating themselves as
the official funeral directors in the policies issued by the asso-
ciated insurance companies results in these particular funeral
establishments being allowed to solicit business through the sale
by agents of burial insurance policies." It was also established
that "funeral directors possessing these contracts give a discount
on each burial policy serviced."'19 The court was unable to find
any benefit to the health or welfare of the public from prohibit-
ing plaintiff's advertisement and concluded that the exemption
from R.S. 37:846A(2) of "funeral directors who service burial
policies in which they are named official funeral director" gave
them "a preference under the law which is denied to others of
the same class," and violated the equal protection clause.
It is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court would
reach this result. However the concept of equal protection may
have evolved in other contexts20 in the regulation of business
the states have been left a large, indeed an almost unlimited
sphere. Conceivably the legislature created the statutory exemp-
tion to encourage the sale of burial insurance which it rationally
considered to be in the public interest. Statutes with classifica-
tions more difficult to justify have been sustained.21 In fact,
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
19. 216 So.2d 145, 148 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
20. For recent cases dealing with "personal rights" see Cipriano v. City
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969)(which is noted in this issue of the RevXew); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
21. See e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v.
Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
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there is only one instance2 of a regulation of business struck
down by the United States Supreme Court under the equal pro-
tection clause in the past thirty years, and one may respectfully
doubt that that case was rightly decided.23
The issue in State ex rel. McKeithen v. Ourso24 was whether
the defendant in a removal proceedings under the Louisiana
constitution 25 was entitled to trial by jury. The court found that
the right of trial by jury when requested in such an action has
been recognized since 1890,26 and held, despite changes in the law
traced by the court, that the right has continued to the present
time. The Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides: "Except
as limited by Article 1733, the right of trial by jury is recog-
nized. '27 None of the limitations of article 1733 applies to a
proceeding for removal.
Mitchell v. Glasgow2, was a taxpayer's action to enjoin pay-
ment to the Director of the Louisiana Wild Life and Fisheries
Commission, and receipt by him, of salary in excess of that pro-
vided in the Constitution and to compel restoration of any such
excess already paid. The Constitution declares: "The salary of
the director shall be not less than $7,500.00 nor more than
$10,000.00 per annum."2 9 The legislature increased the salary of
the director above this range in 1965 and again in 1966,30 relying
on other language of the Constitution: "Salaries of public offi-
cers, whether fixed in this Constitution or otherwise, may be
changed by vote of two-thirds of the members of each House
of the Legislature."3 1
The question, then, was whether the director's salary ("not
less than $7,500.00 nor more than $10,000.00") had been "fixed"
within the meaning of the Constitution. The court answered in
the affirmative, relying on Webster and a belief that it was never
intended that the salary of the director could be increased above
$10,000 only by a constitutional amendment.
22. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
23. See Frankfurter J., dissenting id. at 472 (1957).
24. 213 So.2d 533 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
25. LA. CONST. art IX, §§ 1, 6, 7.
26. State ex rel. Leche v. Waggner, 42 La. Ann. 54, 8 So. 209 (1890).
27. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1731.
28. 220 So.2d 173 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
29. LA. CONST. art. VI, § l(A)(7).
30. See LA. R.S. 56:3.1 (1950).
31. LA. CONST. art. m, § 34.
